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Abstract—The worldwide dial plan proposed by the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union recommendation E.164 reserves
multiple country codes for future use. These unused codes present
an opportunity for a potential covert channel over the public
switched telephone network utilizing a spoofed source phone
number of a call to send information to a mobile device. The
reserved country codes can act as a delimiter indicating that a
secret message is being sent. By spoofing a call using a reserved
country code number, the application listening on the mobile
device will be able to intercept the call and extract information
from the remaining digits based on ASCII encoding in a decimal
format. The purpose of using a reserved country code number
is so that there will be no denied service to the user with a call
from a legitimate phone number.
Keywords—Covert channel; Public Switched Telephone Net-
work; Dial plan; Android; Phone number
I. INTRODUCTION
The public switched telephone network “refers to the
worldwide voice telephone network accessible to all those
with telephones and access privileges,” as defined by Newton
[15]. A dial plan (also commonly referred to as a numbering
plan) is “a numbering scheme used in telecommunications to
allocate telephone number ranges to countries, regions, areas,
and exchanges, and to nonfixed telephone networks such as
mobile phone networks.” [17]. This is essential for call routing
and is the central component of how phone numbers are
allocated to different regions. By taking a subset of a dial
plan, and converting the numeric values to ASCII characters;
it is possible to embed hidden messages from a spoofed calling
source number.
A. Legality
In the United States, the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009
prohibits caller ID spoofing if the caller has “the intent to
defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.”
[2]. However, during the development of this channel, there
were no malicious intents as the tests during development were
utilizing the authors’ own devices.
B. North American Numbering Plan
The ITU E.164 recommendation [10] reserves multiple
country codes such as 0 and 999. There should be no valid
phone call from a phone number beginning with values such
as these since they are “reserved for future use.” [10]. Due to
this, a covert channel can be created by taking advantage of the
worldwide public switched telephone network dial plan. For
the purposes of simplicity in order to elaborate on proposed
methods of extensibility, this covert channel will follow the
standards set forth by the North American Numbering Plan
Administration to adhere to one format as opposed to attempt-
ing to combine multiple regional dial plans, which may differ.
All phone numbers with the assigned country code of 1
fall under the authority of the North American Numbering
Plan Administration [3]. NANPA further breaks down 10 digit
phone numbers by a 3-digit Numbering Plan Area (NPA)
commonly referred to as the area code followed by a 7-digit
local number. The format of phone numbers that fall within
the authority of NANPA is NXX-NXX-XXXX where N is any
digit 2-9 and X is any digit 0-9 [3].
C. Define Covert Channel
Although the field of covert channels is in an embryonic
stage, there have been multiple proposed definitions for covert
channels. In 1973, Butler Lampson introduced the concept of
a covert channel and describes it as “[a channel] not intended
for information transfer at all.” [11]. Gligor reenforced this
definition by describing covert channels as, “[a] communica-
tion channel that allows a process to transfer information in a
manner that violates the system’s security policy.” [8]. Covert
channels have been broken down into three categories: stor-
age, timing, and behavioral-based channels [5]. The channel
proposed in this paper can be classified as a storage channel.
Millen explains that, “Research in covert channels split up
into four disciplines: explaining them, finding them, measuring
them, and mitigating them.” [13]. Further analysis can be
performed on the following three factors: detection, mitigation,
measuring. Considering that the proposed channel has been
explained, the remaining three categories will be discussed
further.
D. Detection and Mitigation
This covert channel can be mitigated and potentially pre-
vented at the network layer where the backbone infrastructure
of the PSTN can examine the source phone number of a call.
If the number is reserved in accordance with the ITU E.164
recommendations, then the call can be blocked and dropped.
However, this can reduce system performance of the PSTN
below acceptable levels since every call would be examined
for potentially spoofed numbers.
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Additionally, it is possible for a transcription of all calls
made to or from a mobile device to be obtained from a wireless
provider. Excessive calling in a short period of time could raise
suspicion.
E. Measuring Throughput and Robustness
When discussing covert channels, it is important to recog-
nize the throughput and robustness of the channel. Throughput
is defined as “the amount of data the channel is able to transmit
over a given period of time,” [7] and robustness is defined as
“the survivability of a given channel.” [7].
The channel can send three ASCII characters through the
first six digits of the local number. Although there are 127
ASCII values, the printable characters have decimal values
between 32 and 127 [4]. This leaves 95 characters that can be
sent. Since 95 is only two digits, each character in the secret
message will only require two digits. Thus, three characters can
be sent with each call. This can be accomplished by taking
the ASCII value of the character being sent, subtracting 32,
sending the message, and then adding 32 back on the other
end to determine the original value. For example, the decimal
value for a capital A using ASCII encoding is 65. Subtracting
32 will result in 33. A phone call from the source address of
999-200-3333335 will send “AAA” since the receiving device
will add 32 to 33 resulting in 65, which is the original message
being sent. Further functionality will be discussed later in this
paper.
The formula for encoding the data on the sending device
is as follows:
M = p− 32
where M is the actual message (the digits) being sent and p is
the ASCII value of the plaintext character. The receiving device
calculates the following formula to determine the original
message sent:
p = M + 32
This covert channel is highly robust since the PSTN is a
core part of the world’s critical infrastructure, and it is not
likely to be removed or shut down.
F. Extensibility
The proposed method of extensibility uses the area code
of a phone number as a pre-shared secret codebook to send
a command code to the device. This code can represent a
command that tells the device what information the sender
is looking for. For example, code 200 may tell the device to
send data via an HTTP POST request to a web server. The
URL of the web server may be a pre-shared secret or it can
be conveyed in the data portion of the number. The former
can potentially become a single point of failure because if a
domain name becomes blacklisted, the phone will not be able
to communicate with that server. However, if the domain can
be conveyed in a secret message to the phone, this will allow
for more flexibility with having a command and control server
for relaying data back to.
If a device receives a phone call from a number beginning
with a reserved value, it should examine the following digits
that may contain a hidden message. This phone call should
be intercepted and terminated before being passed to the
application that receives calls.
II. GENERAL PROCEDURE
The proposed channel will adhere to the standard cre-
ated by the North American Numbering Plan Administration.
This means that following the country code is a three digit
Numbering Plan Area (NPA) followed by a seven digit local
number. The following example is a general method intending
to serve as an outline for potential methods to implement
a covert channel based on the Public Switched Telephone
Network dial plan. An example phone number for this channel
is 999-200-3333335. Upon examining a phone number, three
fields initially stick out: the country code (one to three digits),
the area code (three digits, according to NANPA’s standard),
and the local number (seven digits, according to NANPA’s
standard). This channel breaks up the local number into two




333333 First six digits of local number
5 Last digit of the local number
This channel uses each of the three fields for a different
purpose. The purpose for each is as follows:
• Country code - In this channel, the country code
serves as the delimiter indicating whether there is a
hidden message contained in the digits following. The
application residing on the mobile device looks for
specified reserved country codes or spare codes. For
example, country codes 0 and 999 are both reserved,
and codes such as 280, 424, and 890 are all “spare
codes.” [10]
• Area code - The intention of this field is to provide
the opportunity for the user to send “command codes”
to the mobile device. This will provide a feature for
extensibility and create the opportunity to develop a
framework for users to develop their own commands.
• First six digits of the local number - The first six
digits of the local number are used for sending the
actual covert message using ASCII encoding.
• Last digit of the local number - This value is used
in a method similar to the More Fragment IP header.
The country code is used as a delimiter because it will
look for phone calls from specified reserved country codes
without service as a denial of service to legitimate phone calls
(since it would not pass them up to the dialer). The ITU E.164
recommendation can be examined to determine a country code
to use.
A. Potential Command Codes
1) Remote Wipe: A remote wipe functionality could have
multiple implications. There are currently some commercial
solutions available to remotely wipe a device [12], but a remote
wipe functionality of this channel could prove to be useful for
wiping sensitive data off of a device if it is misplaced or stolen.
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2) HTTP POST: The application can be configured to send
a POST request to a specific server containing information
such as applications installed, a list of contacts, or contents of
text messages.
B. “More Fragments”
According to RFC 791 [6], the “More Fragments” (MF)
flag in the Internet Protocol header is used to indicate “data-
gram is not the last fragment.” Similar to the MF flag in the
IP header, the last digit in the seven digit local number serves
to indicate the end of the transmission of a covert message.
The value will be a predetermined set of values to allow
the sender to inform the receiver when the message is done
transmitting. Instead of relying on just one value to indicate
whether the message is done or if there is still more to come,
there should be multiple values in order to increase the variety
of phone numbers calling. This will increase the covertness
of the channel since there will be less of a pattern of phone
numbers to decrease the detectability. For example, all even
numbers could indicate the end of the transmission and all
odd numbers could indicate that there are still more parts of
the message that the receiver should wait for.
III. PROOF OF CONCEPT
A. Android Application
An Open Source Android application titled ‘Call Code’
[14] was originally designed as a tutorial for developers to
detect incoming and going calls. By modifying the source code
of ”Call Code” [14], it was trivial to derive the last seven digits
of a incoming caller’s number (with the first 6 containing the
secret message). The application is given a higher priority for
changes to the phone state by declaring a higher integer value
for an intent filter in the application’s manifest file. An intent
is “an abstract description of an operation to be performed,”
[1] which can include launching applications. This allows the
application first access to execution upon any change to the
Android phone’s state, including incoming and outgoing calls.
When a call is detected, the application segments the phone
number into “chunks.” These “chunks” contain a country code,
area code, city code and six unique digits where our ASCII
message is derived. After the number is obtained, if it matches
a pre-defined reserved country code value of 999, the call is
dropped never making it to the phone’s dialer application. The
use of the reserved country code 999 is made possible through
third party services that allow spoofing of phone calls. During
testing, the Android application “Mask My Number” [18] was
used. The first six of the last seven digits of the incoming
number are then segmented into three, two digit values that
are converted to their ASCII representation via the method
described in the introduction. In the source of the application,
a hash table is constructed with numeric values associating
with alphabetic characters. If the incoming number contains a
pair of digits that do not have a corresponding value in the
hash table, they are replaced with a null value. If successful,
the character is then written to a file on the external storage
of the Android phone.
B. Forensic Analysis
Considering the method described, if forensic analysis of
the device is performed, the text file can be discovered - even
if it is deleted [9]. Upon examining call logs, the spoofed
number is logged; there is no trace of the number of the
original caller. This is beneficial because the sender can remain
anonymous. However, should the channel be discovered, the
information being relayed can be easily discovered if someone
performing the forensic analysis is able to aggregate all of the
spoofed phone numbers and parse out the digits containing the
message.
IV. FUTURE WORK
OpenBTS is “an open source software project dedicated
to revolutionizing mobile networks by substituting legacy
telco protocols, and traditionally complex, proprietary hard-
ware systems with Internet Protocol and a flexible software
architecture.” [16]. Potential future work includes determining
whether spoofed phone numbers are logged at the base station
as the actual originating source number or whether they are
logged as the spoofed number. As noted previously there are
pros and cons for both options. If the legitimate number is
logged, there will be a lot of short phone calls logged between
the two devices, which may raise suspicion. However, if the
spoofed phone number is logged, it would be possible for
someone with access to the logs to reconstruct the message
if the person is able to determine the encoding scheme being
used. A spoofed phone number may also stick out more if there
are logs that say there is a number that has an unused country
code (such as 999). By simulating a base station utilizing the
OpenBTS software, it would be possible to test this.
Another method which could potentially send more infor-
mation to a mobile device would be to treat the listening
application as a call center application. This would allow a
caller to send a message by pressing buttons similar to pressing
buttons at a menu before waiting to speak with a representative
for a company. This would allow an established connection to
be able to send more data at a single point in time. However,
a drawback of this is that it would most likely cause a denial
of service to the phone since it would not be able to receive
phone calls while that application is listening and connected
with another caller.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the North American Numbering Plan
Administration’s dial plan format and proposes a covert chan-
nel based on the source phone number of a call. Although the
NANPA standard is used in this example, the covert channel
can be extended to use dial plan formats of other regions. By
waiting for a phone call from a number with a specified value
in the country code as the delimiter to indicate the start of
a message, an application listening on the receiving device
can parse the number of the incoming call and determine the
corresponding ASCII characters for the expected message.
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